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Al Mele’s Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility (OUP 2019) is an extraordinarily 
careful and clear little book. A central recurring element is the use of examples of radical value 
reversals due to manipulation. In this commentary, I discuss the relevance of these examples to 
a simple quality of will account of blameworthiness without explicit historical conditions. Such 
an account, I suggest, can fairly straightforwardly explain how value reversals might mitigate 
blameworthiness. But I also suggest that the intuition that they completely remove 
blameworthiness should instead be explained away. 
 I start with a case sharing some key features of Mele’s many examples of radical value 
reversal: 
 
Billy had been a good parent to his three children, aged 2, 4, and 5. Ignoring their needs 
for his own personal pleasure had just not been an option. But overnight, manipulators 
had secretly implanted a set of selfish values, erasing all of Billy’s competing prior values 
in the process. Waking up before the children, he now considers sneaking out to go golfing, 
leaving them to take care of themselves at home during the day. His internal condition 
after the manipulation, including his collection of values, is such that he is able take his 
children’s needs into account and act on those needs, though he has very little inclination 
to do so. However, this ability is not rooted in any preexisting values that survived the 
overnight change. Instead, it is rooted in the implanted collection of values. Billy is 
surprised by the fact that he is now seriously considering ignoring his children, but because 
of his new values he also finds it liberating and exhilarating. He decides to do what was 
previously unthinkable and sneaks out, leaving the children on their own accord. 
 
Let us stipulate that Billy is not only able to tend to his children’s needs, but also satisfies popular 
internal conditions on moral responsibility: he is able to respond to a wide enough range of 
reasons, is aware of the morally significant features of his options, and identifies with and takes 
responsibility for the motives from which he acts, for example. Nevertheless, I take it that Mele 
and many others will have the intuition that Billy isn’t morally blameworthy for leaving his 
children at home. Going by this intuition, blameworthiness is subject to a historical constraint. 
Historical constraints can be positive, requiring that the agent’s relevant internal condition has 
come about in a certain way. But that is not Mele’s suggestion: as far as his intuitions and 
proposals go, agents coming into the world ready-made might be responsible for their actions. 
Instead, the constraint is negative, requiring that the relevant internal conditions has not come 
about in certain ways. 
 If Mele is right, this seems to spell trouble for a variety of accounts of moral responsibility 
that accords no role to how an agent came to be the way they are, focusing only on how they 
are and what they do as a result. In what follows, I will ask about the relevance of radical value 
reversal cases for an account which understands an agent’s blameworthiness for something as 
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grounded in the relation between the agent’s quality of will and the object of blame, but 
operating with no explicit historical constraints. (I focus on blameworthiness rather than 
responsibility generally for reasons of space.) 
 Here are some tempting thoughts that motivate such a quality of will account: First, if some 
decision, action, or outcome isn’t bad in ways that matters morally, it makes no sense to blame 
anyone for it. Second, if an agent has displayed all the responsiveness to reasons that can be 
morally demanded of her in relation to what makes a certain decision, action, or outcome bad, 
she cannot be morally blamed for it. Third, if a morally bad thing happens and someone has 
fallen short of demands on responsiveness to reasons, but the bad thing didn’t happen because 
of the shortcoming, or happened because of it but through some deviant route, the agent is not 
morally to blame for it. If we think of the quality of an agent’s will as a matter of how well she 
responds to available reasons, these thoughts suggest the following minimal account of 
blameworthiness: 
 
EXPLANATORY QUALITY OF WILL (EQW): An agent is to blame for something if and only 
if it is morally bad and due, in a normal way, to the agent’s will falling short of what 
morality demands of her.1 
 
Degrees of blameworthiness might then be, in part, a matter of how bad a will was required to 
explain why the object of blame came about (Björnsson 2017b: 145–8). 
 Though EQW does not include a separate historical condition, it can straightforwardly 
account for some ways in which history matters for blameworthiness. Consider Mele’s 
characters Van and Ike. Each gets into a car and runs over a pedestrian, too intoxicated to 
control the vehicle, but whereas Van willingly and recklessly got drunk, Ike was force-fed 
alcohol. Only Van seems blameworthy for running over the pedestrian (pp. 7–10). According 
to EQW, this is due to the fact that only Van ran over the pedestrian because he didn’t care as 
could be demanded of him about the risks of heavy drinking. Though neither agent’s quality of 
will immediately preceding the accident explains why a pedestrian was hit, Van’s prior 
substandard quality of will, while getting drunk, explains why he did.  
 Historical relations might also be relevant in the case of actions over which the agent has 
control at the time. Generally, what can be reasonably demanded of someone is a function of 
what they are capable of, in some relevant sense. Moreover, as Mele often stresses, what will 
one is capable of in that sense at a given time might be highly constrained by one’s values at 
that time. It could thus be that the operative demands on Billy’s will are weakened by the selfish 
values that have been implanted in him. And if the demands operative at the time are weakened, 
the will at work constitutes less of a deviation from the operative demands, rendering Billy less 
blameworthy. 
 I just suggested that selfish values might mitigate demands to respond to altruistic reasons. 
This doesn’t mean that selfish actions by those who have more selfish values are in general less 
                                               
1 I’ve defended and applied aspects of this account in e.g. Björnsson and Persson 2012; Björnsson 2017. 
I take the account to be very much in line with what Strawson (1962) took to be grounding the 
appropriateness of reactive attitudes. Cf. Arpaly and Schroeder 2014. 
  QUALITY OF WILL AND RADICAL VALUE REVERSALS 3(4) 
 
 
Book Symposium on Alfred Mele’s Manipulated Agents PEA Soup, May 20, 2020  
blameworthy. For what one does at a time is also standardly the normal upshot of numerous 
prior choices and actions, not just in drunk driver cases. Even if one does not fall much short of 
what can be demanded of one at the time, what one does might thus be the upshot of having 
fallen short of modest demands on one’s quality of will on numerous prior occasions, and is 
more likely to be so if one’s values are indeed selfish. And if what happened required for one’s 
will to fall short on numerous prior occasions, it arguably required for one’s will to be worse 
overall, thus grounding more blame than the latest shortcoming itself would suggest.  
 What all this does mean is that someone whose values and quality of will is the upshot of a 
radical value reversal manipulation might be much less to blame than someone who got there 
themselves, as it were, even if the manipulated agent is still in enough control to be subject to 
demands on the will. The manipulation of the agent’s values breaks any normal explanatory 
connection between the agent’s quality of will prior to the manipulation and the quality of will 
from which he acts after the manipulation. 
 This might go some way to accommodating the intuition that those subject to radical value 
reversals have their blameworthiness diminished, but clearly not all the way. Mele, and many 
with him, has the sense that an agent like Billy is not at all responsible for his action. What should 
the quality of will theorist say about that intuition? 
 The first thing to note is that the intuition that radical value reversal cases undermine 
blameworthiness is far from univocal. Personally, when focusing on the manipulation and the 
fact that what Billy did was not previously an option for him, I do have the sense that Billy isn’t 
to blame for what he did. But when I focus on the fact that it remained an option for him not 
to leave the children at home, it also seems that he is to blame, to some extent. So I’m torn. And 
judging by a survey Mele reports in an appendix, others are too. Though considerably more 
subjects were inclined to disagree than agree with the claim that an agent like Billy is morally 
responsible for his actions, the disagreement was not resounding: the mean response on a scale 
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) was a little over 3. 
 Why are intuitions not clearer than this? Elsewhere I have argued that, in line with EQW, 
to see someone as blameworthy for something is to see the object of blame as due to, or 
explained by, the agent’s substandard quality of will. Seeing X as explained by Y in turn involves 
(i) taking a certain explanatory perspective, employing an explanatory model which represents 
lawlike relations between variables of interest, and (ii) seeing how X follows from Y in 
accordance with this model given certain background conditions. One is thus in effect treating 
Y as the value of an independent variable in the model, and X as the value of a dependent 
variable. Importantly, what explanatory perspective we take can shift depending on explanatory 
interests, the salience of various candidate explanantia, and on how straightforwardly these 
explanantia account for the explanandum. If a house is hit by lightning and burns down, we 
might naturally think that the house burned down because it was hit by lightning. In doing so, 
we treat the presence of oxygen, the combustibility of the house, and the absence of a lightning 
rod as background, ignore whatever atmospheric conditions gave rise to the lightning, and 
understand the events between the strike of lightning and the final outcome as values of 
intermediary dependent variables: compared to the background, the lightning is more out of 
the ordinary; whatever caused the lightning is less salient and straightforwardly connected to 
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the outcome; and the intermediaries—that a fire started in the attic, say—are comparatively 
less interesting as they are straightforwardly accounted for by the fact that the lightning hit. A 
fire engineer might take a different perspective. She might treat the lightning as background 
and see the outcome as explained by the absence of a lightning rod. Or she might find the fact 
that the fire started in the attic particularly interesting, as houses might be especially vulnerable 
to fires starting there: why it started there is now less interesting.  
 Based on this, I’ve suggested that considerations of determinism, various forms of luck, and 
manipulation cases all undermine our sense that the agents involve are responsible for their 
actions because they provide powerful prompts to change explanatory perspective to one from 
which the agent’s quality of will no longer seems to be what explains the object of responsibility 
(Björnsson and Persson 2012; 2013; Björnsson 2017b: 155–62). This story applies 
straightforwardly to cases involving radical value reversals. Such reversals are themselves 
remarkable events, and they straightforwardly account for the agent’s quality of will and the 
resulting action as well as the remarkable fact that what the agent did had previously not even 
been an option for her. Given this, we will be prompted to see the reversal as what explains the 
agent’s actions. And when we do, the agent’s quality of will at the time of action is only seen as 
an intermediary explanatory step, rather than as what explains the action: the agent no longer 
seems blameworthy for it. But, as compatibilists often do, one can resist these prompts by 
focusing attention on the agent’s quality of will and treating it as an independent variable, 
returning to the sort of normal everyday explanatory perspective from which we standardly 
assess whether some decision, action, or outcome was due to the agent’s quality of will. It is the 
possibility of these different perspectives that explains why intuitions concerning the 
responsibility undermining effects of determinism, luck, and forms of manipulation varies and 
remain ambivalent in many of us.  
 If this is correct, the question is what the right perspective is for assessing an agent’s 
responsibility and blameworthiness. Here, I have argued, various lines of reasoning suggest that 
it is the sort of everyday perspective that treats the agent’s quality of will as an independent 
variable (Björnsson and Persson 2012). If this is correct, the sense that agents are not at all 
responsible for what they do after radical value reversals is illusory. 
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